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The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
1
Emotional Harm (2010) (Third Restatement) seeks to synthesize,
clarify, and rationalize the law of negligence by restating its
elements and basic rules in progressive, modern terms. Prominent
among its provisions is section 7, which contains the presumption
of a duty to exercise reasonable care that is applicable in most cases
and rules for what should be rare instances of “no-duty”
2
determinations.
†
Larry S. Stewart is a member of the Council of the American Law Institute
and is an adviser for the Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical and
Emotional Harm (2010). He is board certified as a civil trial lawyer by the Florida
Bar and the National Board of Trial Advocacy and is a member of the American
College of Trial Lawyers, the American Board of Trial Advocates, the International
Academy of Trial Lawyers, the International Society of Barristers, and the Inner
Circle of Advocates. A frequent author and lecturer in tort law, he has received
numerous professional awards.
1. The Restatement (Third) of Torts: Liability for Physical & Emotional
Harm is not yet finished. See Current Projects, Restatement Third, Torts: Liability for
Physical and Emotional Harm, AMERICAN LAW INSTITUTE, http://www.ali.org
/index.cfm?fuseaction=projects.proj_ip&projectid=16 (last visited Jan. 3, 2011).
Chapters one through six, which cover definitions, negligence, duty, strict liability,
factual cause, and scope of liability were published in 2010 as Volume 1. Id.
Volume 2, covering affirmative duties, emotional harm, and landowner liability
also have been approved but await the drafting of a final chapter on the liability of
actors who retain independent contractors. Id.
2. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
7 (2010). Courts are already embracing key provisions of section 7. See Van Fossen
v. MidAmerican Energy Co., 777 N.W.2d 689, 696 (Iowa 2009) (discussing the new
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There is much to applaud in this treatment of duty, although,
in some respects, the Third Restatement could have gone further
and provided more clarity. This comment explores the rules
provided, how those rules could be clarified, and provides
suggestions for how the analytical process could be improved.
Specifically, this comment makes five points: (1) “social norms,” as
distinguished from public policy, are antithetical to the core
3
rationale for duty and should play no role in duty determinations;
(2) cost-benefit analyses should also play no role in duty
4
determinations; (3) the Third Restatement has it right on the role
5
of relationality; (4) the role of discretionary government authority
6
could be better explained in terms of an affirmative duty analysis;
and (5) further guidance could be provided for the duty analysis
7
process.
I.

DUTY UNDER SECTION 7

The role of duty in modern tort law has not been without
controversy. At times it served as a means to expand tort law; in
more recent times, it has been increasingly applied regressively to
8
roll back tort liability. Commentators have disagreed on its proper
9
role. Decisions have been confusing with some declaring that duty
no-duty framework and finding that “summary judgment was . . . proper under
[the court’s] newly adopted analytical principles”); Thompson v. Kaczinski, 774
N.W.2d 829, 835 (Iowa 2009) (“We find the drafters’ clarification of the duty
analysis in the Restatement (Third) compelling, and we now, therefore, adopt
it.”); A.W. v. Lancaster Cnty. Sch. Dist. 0001, 784 N.W.2d 907, 917 (Neb. 2010)
(considering the new duty rules and finding “the reasoning of the Restatement
(Third), and . . . fellow courts that have endorsed it, to be persuasive”); see also
Gipson v. Kasey, 150 P.3d 228, 235 (Ariz. 2007) (Hurwitz, J., concurring) (noting
that while it made no difference which version of the duty rule was adopted in the
present case, there are “advantages of the Third Restatement approach to duty”
and suggesting the court adopt that approach in the future).
3. See infra Part II.
4. See infra Part III.
5. See infra Part IV.
6. See infra Part V.
7. See infra Part VI.
8. W. Johnathan Cardi & Michael D. Green, Duty Wars, 81 S. CAL. L. REV.
671, 672 (2008) (discussing California’s important role in the “development of the
modern law of duty” and noting that the California Supreme Court “first swe[pt]
aside a variety of no-duty impediments to liability and then reinvigorat[ed] duty
(more accurately, no-duty) as an instrument for limiting liability as the expansion
of tort law ground to a halt and reversed course in the 1980s and 1990s”).
9. Id. at 671 (“Academics . . . continue to battle over the proper role for duty
in contemporary tort law.”).
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is categorical and others treating duty as fact-specific or grounded
10
in foreseeability concepts.
The duty rules delineated in section 7 of the Third
Restatement bring clarity to the law by restating the general rule
that all actors have a duty to exercise care to prevent injury to
11
others “when the actor’s conduct creates a risk of physical harm.”
As the Third Restatement makes clear, this presumption of duty is
the default rule that applies in the vast majority of cases and
circumstances and trial courts generally need not concern
12
themselves with the existence of a duty.
Under section 7, the obligation is on one claiming that a duty
13
should not exist to raise and prevail on that claim. In that sense, it
is section 7(b) that does the duty determination work but section
7(a) provides the basis of an analytical framework by grounding
duty in the presumption that a duty exists. Section 7 also
constrains duty determinations by making clear that foreseeability
is a matter of causation, not duty, and foreseeability concepts play
14
no role in duty determination.
Likewise, section 7 comments
make clear that the duty rubric should not be used to invade the
15
province of the jury. Hence, determinations based on a lack of
evidence (where reasonable minds can differ) are matters of
16
liability, not duty, and the two should not be conflated.
To ensure the limited scope of no-duty determinations and to
preserve the integrity of trial by jury, section 7(b) provides that only
in “exceptional cases, when an articulated principle or policy
warrants denying or limiting [duty] in a particular class of cases”
17
should courts adopt a no-duty rule.
Comments to section 7
10.
11.

Id. at 671–78.
Compare RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 7(a) (2010) (stating that an actor has a duty when his “conduct creates a
risk of physical harm”), with RESTATEMENT (SECOND) OF TORTS § 302 (1965)
(describing a negligent act as one that involves an “unreasonable risk of harm to
another”). The duty to exercise care applies to both acts and omissions.
RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM § 3 cmts.
c, k (2010). It also applies to situations where the actor has an affirmative duty to
act. Id. §§ 37–44 (Proposed Final Draft No. 1, 2005).
12. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM
§§ 6 cmt. f, 7 cmt. a.
13. Id. § 7 cmt. b.
14. Id. § 7 cmt. j.
15. Id.
16. Id. § 7 cmt. i.
17. Duty determinations include limitations on duty short of a complete noduty determination. Id. § 7(b) (“[A] court may decide that the defendant has no
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emphasize that any such rulings should be categorical, bright-line
rulings that are not fact-specific and admonish courts “to
18
articulate . . . the policy or principle” on which they are acting.
This formulation will, in large part, bring much needed clarity
to the law. Requiring courts to articulate their reasoning allows
transparency that will foster understanding or allow others to
challenge the basis for the decision. Limiting no-duty rules to
exceptional categories of cases protects the long-standing right of
parties to trial by jury. Additionally, bright-line rules avoid the
confusion of decisions that mask factual determinations with a duty
rubric.
But, for all it has accomplished, the Third Restatement could
have brought more clarity. While duty issues arise only at the
margin in a very small number of cases, in making duty
determinations courts sometimes use inappropriate case-specific
“factors” and/or rely on “factors” that conflict with the
19
fundamental rights that are the core of section 7 duty.
That
should not happen in a well-ordered regime. While public policy,
conflicts with other domains of law, and institutional competence
are undisputed bases on which courts determine that no tort duty
20
exists,
social norms, cost-benefit considerations, and the
relationship between the parties should not be the basis of a noduty determination. Even though courts correctly decide that
governmental entities have no duty to exercise their discretionary
21
functions, those decisions could be better grounded. Finally,
more guidance could be provided for how courts should navigate
the process of duty determination. The balance of this comment
explores those subjects.

duty or that the ordinary duty of reasonable care requires modification.”) (emphasis
added). In the interest of brevity, “no duty” will be used herein to encompass the
full range of possible duty rulings.
18. Id. § 7 cmts. a, i, j.
19. See, e.g., Great Houston Transp. Co. v. Phillips, 801 S.W.2d 523, 525 (Tex.
1990) (“In determining whether the defendant was under a duty, the court will
consider several interrelated factors, including the risk, foreseeability, and
likelihood of injury weighed against the social utility of the actor’s conduct, the
magnitude of the burden of guarding against the injury, and the consequences of
placing the burden on the defendant.”).
20. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 7(b) cmts. d, f (2010).
21. See id. § 7 cmt. g.
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SOCIAL NORMS

Comment “c” to section 7 endorses “articulating general social
norms of responsibility as the basis for [a no-duty]
22
determination.” To properly examine the role this factor should
play, it must first be distinguished from public policy. “Public
policy” and “social norms” have, at times, been used
23
interchangeably. While public policy implicates moral judgments,
social norms are different. Although difficult to define, public
policy is grounded on a common or community judgment about
what is inherently just and right for public health, safety, and
welfare, sometimes but not necessarily as declared by constitution,
24
statute, or judicial decision. By definition, social norms on the
other hand can, but do not necessarily, involve a moral
25
component.
They are commonly understood as describing
26
conduct that is typical of specific groups. Often they follow or
mirror public opinion and are therefore subject to change with the
27
whims of popular opinion.

22. Id. § 7 cmt. c.
23. See, e.g., Noye v. Hoffmann-La Roche, Inc., 570 A.2d 12, 14 (N.J. Super.
Ct. App. Div. 1990) (discussing tort damages in a breach of contract context and
stating that “[t]he tort lay not in the breach of contract but in the violation of
valuable social norms-denominated by the court as clear mandates of public
policy”).
24.
E.g., Bell Care Nurses Registry, Inc. v. Cont’l Cas. Co., 25 So. 3d 13, 18
(Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 2009) (discussing the meaning of public policy when
interpreting certain provisions of an insurance policy); Mullins v. N. Ky.
Inspections, Inc., No. 2009-CA-000067-MR., 2010 WL 3447630, at *4 (Ky. Ct. App.
Sept. 3, 2010) (discussing this definition of public policy when considering a
liability limiting provision in a home inspector’s contract); Skutt v. Grand Rapids,
266 N.W. 344, 346 (Mich. 1936) (considering “the rule of public policy” when
determining the enforceability of a contract).
25. See Scott R. Belhorn, Note, Settling Beyond the Shadow of the Law: How
Mediation Can Make the Most of Social Norms, 20 OHIO ST. J. ON DISP. RESOL. 981, 985
n.10 (2005) (“Normative standards encompass a wide range of socially
conditioned information, ranging from moral judgments (do not lie), to
community norms (do not smoke near others), to shared values within a discrete
nuclear family . . . to industry-wide practices . . . .”).
26. Id. at 984 (“When a group encourages some behavior, either by providing
incentives for conformity or else sanctioning deviants, then that behavior qualifies
as a social norm.”).
27. See Cass R. Sunstein, Social Norms and Social Roles, 96 COLUM. L. REV. 903,
959 (1996) (discussing the relationship between the law and social norms and
noting that “[p]eople may actually reject existing norms but fail to state their
opposition publicly, and once public opposition becomes less costly, new norms
may rapidly come into place”).
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The issue of social host liability illustrates these differences and
exploring those cases exposes the conceptual flaws inherent in
relying on social norms as a factor for duty determinations. It can
be the social norm for a host to provide alcoholic drinks to guests,
even though it can be dangerous or harmful to others and can
induce conduct that is contrary to public policy. Because it is
foreseeable that social guests who over-consume alcohol will, on
leaving the host’s premises, operate their vehicles in ways that risk
harm to others, social host liability cannot be causally limited.
Courts expressly or impliedly recognize this social norm by treating
these cases as involving duty issues.
Most, if not all, jurisdictions have strong public policies against
28
driving under the influence of alcohol. Some courts cite those
policies as reasons for imposing a duty of reasonable care on social
hosts. This reasoning is at odds with the section 7 presumption of
duty but nonetheless reaches a result that is consistent with section
7’s duty presumption, and which reflects the lack of policy reasons
29
for denying a duty. In doing so, these courts recognize that it is
public policy, not social norms, that are determinative.
Other courts (and dissenting opinions in duty jurisdictions)
couple concerns about the difficulties posed by the range of
circumstances that could exist in such cases—the widely varying
nature of social entertaining, the difficulty of discerning guest
intoxication, and the uncertainty of what actions the host should
take—and disruption in the norms of social behavior as grounds

28. See, e.g., Kelly v. Gwinnell, 476 A.2d 1219, 1226 (N.J. 1984) (“[W]e assume
that our decisions are found to be consonant with the strong legislative policy
against drunken driving.”), superseded by statute, N.J. STAT. ANN. 2A:15-5.7 (2000).
29. See, e.g., Clark v. Mincks, 364 N.W.2d 226, 230 (Iowa 1985) (imposing a
duty on a social host who provided alcohol to an intoxicated person where the
host knew that person would be driving and finding public policy reasons
supportive of its decision); Koback v. Crook, 366 N.W.2d 857, 865 (Wis. 1985)
(imposing a duty on a social host and citing the reasoning in Gwinnell). When it is
minors who have consumed the alcohol, different public policy considerations
may be invoked. See, e.g., DiOssi v. Maroney, 548 A.2d 1361, 1367 (Del. 1988)
(noting that there are “special hazards” and public policy concerns implicated in
serving alcoholic beverages to minors); Sutter v. Hutchings, 327 S.E.2d 716, 720
(Ga. 1985) (“Finally, we pose this question: Which is the more valuable right, the
right to serve alcohol to one’s underage high school friends, or the right not to be
killed by an intoxicated underage driver? There is no right to serve alcohol to
one’s underage high school friends.”), superseded by statute, GA. CODE ANN. § 51-1-40
(2000); Longstreth v. Gensel, 377 N.W.2d 804, 815 (Mich. 1985) (“The dangers
and policy considerations related to serving intoxicants are especially significant
when underage persons are involved.”).
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30

for denying a host duty. This reasoning, however, does not survive
analysis as is demonstrated by examining those bases separately.
Hypothesizing factual difficulties injects case-specific concerns
into the calculus that are not capable of categorical
characterization. Thus, for example, a hypothetical difficulty in
controlling the serving of alcohol would not be present in a case
where the host provided a bartender. Likewise, a hypothetical
difficulty in discerning guest intoxication would not be present in a
case where the guest was staggering and slurring speech. To the
extent relevant, those kinds of factual issues bear on the
reasonableness or causality of the host’s conduct, not duty, and can
support rulings as a matter of law only where reasonable minds
31
cannot differ on the specific facts of the individual case.
Stripping the social norm of serving alcohol at social
gatherings from case-specific issues focuses the inquiry on whether
social norms are an appropriate factor for duty determinations.
For example, would courts still find no duty in a case where a host
engaged in binge drinking with guests to the point of obvious
“knee walking” intoxication and a guest staggered to his car, drove
a short distance, and crashed into another car causing horrible
injuries and deaths? Under those circumstances negligence and
causation would be obvious. Would then the social norm of serving
alcohol alone be sufficient to justify a no-duty determination? Or
would a court find that while it is the social norm to serve alcohol,
it is not the social norm to serve alcohol to the point of clear and
obvious intoxication? If identifying social norms is fact-specific or
norms require parsing, categorical treatment unravels and courts
are back to making inappropriate fact-specific duty determinations.

30. E.g., Johnston v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 788 P.2d 159 (Haw. 1990);
Settlemyer v. Wilmington Veterans Post No. 49, 464 N.E.2d 521 (Ohio 1984); Graff
v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918 (Tex. 1993); Burkhart v. Harrod, 755 P.2d 759 (Wash.
1988).
31. E.g., McGuiggan v. New England Tele. & Tele. Co., 496 N.E.2d 141, 146
(Mass. 1986) (holding as a matter of law that the defendant homeowners were not
negligent because they did not serve alcohol to the guest nor were they aware of
the guest’s intoxication); Sacci v. Metaxas, 810 A.2d 1119, 1126 (N.J. 2002)
(holding that even if wife had a duty to warn third party of potential danger to the
third party by her intoxicated husband, the wife’s purchase of alcohol for her
husband was not a “proximate cause” of third party’s death because the husband’s
actions were not the result of drinking but rather a systematic and deliberative
process and wife had no knowledge of his activities).
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More important, using a social norm (of serving alcohol at
social gatherings) to trump public policies (against driving under
the influence of alcohol) undermines core rationales of modern
32
tort law. Public policy is at the foundation of duty. The definition
of duty has been notably stated as “the sum total of those
considerations of policy which lead the law to say that the particular
33
plaintiff is entitled to protection.”
Justifying no-duty on a basis that allows risky behavior contrary
to public policy to trump the presumptive duty to exercise care to
prevent harm to others is antithetical to the core rationale of tort
duty. In recognizing a presumptive duty to exercise care to prevent
harm to others, the Third Restatement aligned itself with a rightsbased theory of tort law anchored in the fundamental right of
individuals to be free from risks created by others or, put another
34
way, in the right to individual autonomy and personal security. In
such a regime, duty should not be dependent on a social norm
inquiry.
That is because fundamental individual rights to
autonomy and security should not be compromised or eliminated
merely to conform tort law to some social norm, especially where
that norm has no moral value. It is only morally based public
policy that should compel individual rights to give way to the
welfare or well being of the community as a whole.
Returning to the social host liability issue, it is the host’s
conduct—in supplying alcohol, not monitoring its consumption, or
allowing the intoxicated guest to drive—that creates a risk of harm
to others. The duty analysis should therefore begin with a
presumption that the host had a duty to exercise reasonable care
and the outcome should be based on sound public policies, not
social norms.
32. See, e.g., W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF
TORTS § 53, at 358 (5th ed. 1984).
33. Id.
34. Mark A. Geistfeld, Social Value as a Policy-Based Limitation of the Ordinary
Duty to Exercise Reasonable Care, 44 WAKE FOREST L. REV. 899, 906 (2009). Geistfeld
concludes that rights-based theory requires consideration of social values, a point
that does not necessarily follow. Id. at 922. To the extent that social values
conflicted with individual autonomy and personal security, they would limit, not
support those objectives. Id. at 906. Rights-based concepts also underlie
intentional tort rules, which protect against intentional invasion of individual
autonomy and personal security. Id. Thus, whether conduct is merely negligent
or even intentional, tort law recognizes a universal right to individual autonomy
and personal security. Id. See, however, infra note 42 for a different view in the
case of product liability design defect claims.
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COST-BENEFIT ANALYSES

Cost-benefit analyses are a means to evaluate the
35
They are at the core of efficiency
reasonableness of conduct.
rationales that seek to limit liability whenever the supposed costs of
liability exceed its social benefits. At a more functional level, they
can be used to argue that an actor need not take actions that would
36
be more costly than any benefit that could be realized. As such,
cost-benefit analysis is part of the breach calculus, not a duty
37
factor. Section 7 is, however, silent on their inapplicability in duty
determination even though some courts cite cost-benefit analyses as
a duty factor. For example, in determining whether handgun
manufacturers owe a marketing duty of care to the public, the
court in Hamilton v. Beretta U.S.A. Corp. noted that duty “must be
tailored to reflect accurately the extent that its social benefits
38
outweigh its costs.”
When courts so reason, they conflate breach and duty,
masking a no-breach decision or an inability to articulate the real
principles that are driving the decision. At other times, courts are
simply citing “factors” that have no real relation to the decision39
making process.
These are the type of results that the Third
Restatement seeks to prevent by calling for clearly articulated,

35. See generally Paul R. Portney, Benefit-Cost Analysis, THE CONCISE ENCYCLOPEDIA
ECONOMICS, http://www.econlib.org/library/Enc/BenefitCostAnalysis.html (last
visited Jan. 3, 2011) (discussing the use of cost-benefit economic analysis in the
context of government policy-making).
36. Mark A. Geistfeld, Efficiency, Fairness and the Economic Analysis of Tort Law,
in Theoretical Foundations of Law and Economics 45–46 (N.Y. Univ. Law & Econ.,
Working Paper No. 184, 2009), available at http://lsr.nellco.org/nyu_lewp/184/.
37. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
3 cmt. e (2010); see also RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (1998)
(adopting a risk-benefit theory as part of a new negligence standard for design
defect cases). While highly controversial, it illustrates that risk-benefit analyses go
to breach, not duty. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b)
(1998); Symposium, The Products Liability Restatement: Was It a Success?: Strict Liability
for Defective Product Design: The Quest for a Well-Ordered Regime, 74 BROOKLYN L. REV.
1039, 1039 (2009).
38. 750 N.E.2d 1055, 1060–61 (N.Y. 2001); see also Burkhart v. Harrod, 755 P.2d
759, 761 (Wash. 1988) (“Evaluating the overall merits of social host liability . . .
requires a balancing of the costs and benefits for society as a whole.”).
39. E.g., Johnston v. KFC Nat’l Mgmt. Co., 788 P.2d 159, 163–64 (Haw. 1990)
(citing Burkhart v. Harrod, 755 P.2d 759, 761 (Wash. 1988) for the need for
consideration of costs and benefits but not doing so); Hamilton, 750 N.E.2d at
1060–61 (citing a cost-benefit analysis but then basing its decision on whether
there was a duty to control third parties to prevent them from harming others).
OF
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40

principled duty decisions.
Courts should recognize that in making duty decisions, costbenefit analyses should play no role. It is not just because doing so
would conflate breach and duty. As with the case of social norms, if
cost-benefit analyses were used as a duty factor, it would sanction
limiting individual rights to achieve net social values for the
community at large—a result that would be antithetical to the core
41
rationale for negligence liability. In other words, bending duty to
efficiency would mean that whenever the costs of action outweigh
its benefits, there would be no duty to undertake that action and
individual rights would be required to give way. Such a result
would be repugnant to the individual rights of autonomy and
42
personal security which lie at the core of tort duty.
There is also a serious question about the competence of
courts to assess costs and benefits. While the cost of adding
components or features to a product is subject to ascertainment
and proof, in many instances there is no ready way to measure the
cost of conduct in exercising care. Likewise, while there is some
data on the cost of injuries which would be eliminated if harm was
avoided, there is no other ready way to measure the benefits that
could result from eliminating risky behavior. Without empirical
databases or case-specific evidence from a trial on the merits, the
evaluation of costs and benefits would be left to the undisciplined
speculation of individual judges. In either event, these are factspecific inquires that relate to negligence, not duty. It may be for
those reasons that even though the Hamilton court articulated a
cost-benefit approach it avoided undertaking any cost-benefit
analysis as a basis for its decision.

40. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
7 cmts. a, i, j (2010).
41. Id. § 6 cmt. d.
42. One aspect of tort law takes a contrary view. Section 2(b) of Restatement
(Third) of Torts: Products Liability adopts a rule under which manufacturers
would not be liable for defects in the design of their products unless the product is
not reasonably safe, measured by whether the product’s risks are greater than its
benefits (and whether there was an alternative design). Rather than strict liability
or a presumptive duty of care, from a design standpoint, products would be
presumptively safe—even if they failed to perform as safely as an ordinary
consumer would expect—unless the injured consumer could establish a sufficient
quantum of risk. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: PRODS. LIAB. § 2(b) (2009).
That rule would subjugate individual rights to a cost-benefit analysis. It has not
been without controversy. See Symposium, supra note 37, at 1044–48.
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Returning again to the issue of social host liability illustrates
the flaw of cost-benefit analyses as a basis for categorical decisions.
Because of the many varying circumstances of social entertaining,
the costs and benefits of exercising care will vary widely—a point
43
implicitly made in many of the no-duty cases.
Under such
circumstances, whether costs or benefits predominate (or what
might constitute reasonable care) in one case does not mean that
the same result will follow in other cases. That is a case-specific
decision that cannot be extrapolated into a categorical rule and a
clear admonition that cost-benefit analyses should not play any role
in duty determination would help clarify the Third Restatement.
IV.

RELATIONALITY

The Third Restatement correctly adopts the view that
relationships between parties should not be a determinative duty
factor except in the context of affirmative duties where certain
“special” relationships give rise to a duty to act or control the
44
conduct of third parties. Insofar as no-duty determinations under
section 7(b) are concerned, inter-party relationships are relevant
only to the extent that they implicate policy reasons for modifying
45
the presumed duty of care.
This is so because in a rights-based regime, the presumptive
duty to exercise care must apply to all persons, even complete
strangers to the actor. Allowing that duty to be attenuated by
relationality concerns would necessarily mean that individual
interests of some would be subjugated to a right of the actor to
engage in risky behavior. It would also require inquiry into many
non-categorical, fact-specific, nuances of relationships that are the
province of breach and causation. It is for those reasons that
relationality issues do not constitute a separate or independent
basis for no-duty determinations but rather a reason for invoking
46
public policy.
Thus, the relationship between landowners and
those on their property may be a basis for invoking public policies
concerning the rights of property owners, but it is the public
policies, not the relationship, which is the operating principle.
43.
See, e.g., Graff v. Beard, 858 S.W.2d 918, 921 (Tex. 1993) (hypothesizing
on the myriad of circumstances of social entertaining).
44. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
39 (2010).
45. Id. § 7 cmt. e.
46. Id. § 7 cmts. e, g reporters’ note.
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Stated another way, the relationship between parties is not a per se
duty “limitation.”
V.

GOVERNMENT DISCRETION

Comment “g” to section 7 notes deference to the discretion of
other branches of government as a factor for no-duty
determinations in the so-called “public duty” class of cases. When
not prohibited by sovereign immunity, these cases typically involve
police or fire agencies and arise when the agencies fail to act to
protect an individual or group of individuals, usually as a result of a
47
conscious allocation of resources. Often these decisions are based
on a lack of a duty to the “public at large” and/or concerns over
the competence of courts to adjudicate the appropriateness of
48
conduct of other branches of government. But that avoids a more
obvious and principled basis for decision.
There is nothing inherently wrong with treating these cases as
a unique set of section 7 no-duty decisions. Because of the strong
reluctance of courts to “second guess” discretionary decisions of
49
other branches of government, they could also be treated as a subset of institutional competence. But those alternatives create a
certain conceptual awkwardness since the discretionary nature of
the government’s authority and institutional competence does not
eliminate a duty to exercise care once the government entity
undertakes to act in relation to an individual or specific group of
50
individuals.
Stripping away the discretionary nature of the
conduct and the reluctance of courts to second-guess decisions of
other branches of government leaves a decision not to act, which
forms the basis for a more coherent and principled reason for
these no-duty decisions.
47. Id. § 7 cmt. f reporters’ note.
48. E.g., Wong v. City of Miami, 237 So. 2d 132, 133–34 (Fla. 1970) (holding
that after initially providing police protection during the course of a riot, no
private duty to continue that protection existed).
49. E.g., id. at 134 (stating that “[t]he sovereign authorities ought to be left
free to exercise their discretion and choose the tactics deemed appropriate
without worry over possible allegations of negligence”).
50. RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL HARM §
41 (2010). Thus, for example, governmental agencies can be liable for the use of
excessive force. See City of Miami v. Simpson, 172 So. 2d 435 (Fla. 1965) ( finding
a police officer committed assault in effecting arrest); Jaworski v. City of Opa
Locka, 170 So. 2d 484 (Fla. Dist. Ct. App. 1964) (explaining the failure to exercise
care for the protection of someone in custody when a police officer assaulted a
prisoner in custody in the city’s jail).
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Under section 7 there is no affirmative duty of reasonable care
51
when the actor’s conduct has not created the risk of harm. The
failure of government agencies to exercise discretion and act does
not create the risk of harm but only fails to protect against that
harm. This is a classic section 7 case. Thus, it can be reasoned that
government agencies have no duty to come to the aid or rescue of
specific individuals or groups of individuals but, once they do
undertake action involving a specific individual, they have a duty to
exercise care to avoid causing harm. It is only the former situation
where courts do not intrude.
VI.

A HIERARCHICAL STRUCTURE

Ensuring that no-duty determinations are not based on social
norms, cost-benefit analyses, or the absence of any relational status
and, instead, are based on recognized public policy, clear conflicts
with other domains of law, or demonstrable institutional
incompetence will narrow the focus of no-duty inquiries for the
better. It will bring order, clarity, and consistency to decisions and
will help segregate the elements of negligence so that the roles of
judge and jury are maintained.
Moreover, clarifying that
foreseeability plays no role in duty determinations furthers those
goals and dissuades courts from masking fact-based decisions in
duty rubric.
Apart from those important boundary rules, the Third
Restatement also provides an analytical structure for no-duty
determinations. The beginning point is the presumption of duty
with the burden on the objector to establish policy or principle
52
reasons why that duty should not exist. Thus, the no-duty issue
should be whether there are valid public policy reasons, clear
irreconcilable conflicts with other domains of law, or irreconcilable
issues of institutional competence to exempt categories of actors
53
from the duty to exercise reasonable care.
51. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 7 cmt. 1 (2010).
52. Id. at § 7 cmt. b. See, e.g., Yount v. Johnson, 915 P.2d 341, 345–47 (N.M.
Ct. App. 1996) (finding no public policy reasons to extend the modified duty
applicable in organized contact sports to “horseplay”).
53. Courts have frequently reversed the analysis. Instead of starting with the
presumptive duty of reasonable care, some courts use public policy to find a duty.
See, e.g., J.S. v. R.T.H., 714 A.2d 924 (N.J. 1998) (using public policy and
foreseeability to hold spouse had a duty to warn of other spouse’s criminal sexual
propensities). While the result is the same, following the analytical framework of
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Unfortunately, the Third Restatement provides little guidance
for how those factors should be evaluated in the duty decisionmaking process. It is not enough to only exhort courts to make
categorical rulings and articulate reasons for decisions. Leaving it
to individual courts to form their own methodology (or not use one
at all) can result in unprincipled or unpredictable duty
determinations. For example, without any guidelines, two different
courts could consider identical factors in identical cases and yet
come to opposite conclusions depending on the personal
philosophies, experiences, or proclivities of the judges. A fully
developed set of rules should not permit that outcome.
A starting point for guidance can be found in the foundational
precepts of individual rights and the basic rationales for negligence
54
law. Thus, as a matter of proper perspective, individual autonomy
and personal security should be at the foundation of all duty
55
determinations. These rights would not necessarily trump other
factors. Courts would still be free to conform duty to public policy
or to consider conflicts with other domains of law or institutional
incompetence, but using these rights to inform the decision would
provide an important baseline reference for duty determinations.
In weighing the duty issue, those rights should not be lightly
compromised. Thus, contravening public policy should be clear,
conflicts with other domains of law or institutional incompetence
should be substantial, and those factors should justify duty
modification only where there is irreconcilable conflict and an
articulable basis to justify trumping the presumptive tort duty.
A second baseline is provided by the twin negligence rationales
of corrective justice and deterrence of socially dangerous
56
behavior. Tort law remedies an injustice caused by the defendant
the Third Restatement will result in a more coherent, understandable decision.
Thus, in J.S. foreseeability should have played no role and the presumptive duty to
exercise care and the absence of any public policy considerations to modify that
duty were sufficient.
54. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 6 cmt. d (2010).
55. While individual autonomy applies equally to all actors, there is no
conflict in subjugating an actor’s autonomy to other individuals’ rights to personal
security since there is no right to engage in risky behavior that could harm others
and such conduct violates basic public policy that one’s activities be conducted in
a socially reasonable way.
56. See RESTATEMENT (THIRD) OF TORTS: LIAB. FOR PHYSICAL & EMOTIONAL
HARM § 6 cmt. d (2010).
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and provides an incentive to engage in safe conduct. The overall
social welfare is improved and activities are forced to be conducted
in a prudent manner—outcomes that are generally consistent with
the goals of public policy. No-duty rules prevent these ameliorative
effects and courts should avoid them only where there are clear
and strong reasons to do so. In other words, unless the scales tip
clearly in favor of no-duty, the presumptive rule should apply.
To be sure, applying these rules to duty determinations will
not be decisive and courts will still have to use reason and logic, but
adhering to these rules would clarify analysis. Furthermore, clearly
articulated reasoning in “bright-line” decisions would reduce
confusion, produce principled, replicable decisions, and,
ultimately, improve the administration of justice.
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